ECHOING SYARI'AH IN CITY SPACES:
The Framing Process and Political Mobilization of the Islamic Movement in North Sumatra

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Abstract: This article discusses the Islamic political movement in fighting for sharia as an ethic of life in urban areas in Indonesia. In a more detailed manner, this article explores the idea of sharia as the main ingredient in the framing process and explores the movement's strategy to resonate with this frame, which then opens up opportunities for the formation of a wave of support for serial movement actions in Medan, North Sumatra. With the framing model in social movement studies, the data was collected from observations and interviews with several movement actors, and several supporting documents. This study found that the idea of this movements such as *"Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia Bersyari'ah"* (Indonesia Nation State based on Sharia) which is close to the social psychology of the masses met with the right events to generate great support for the movement. The ability of the elites to concoct the movement ideas, and the management of social media to spread such framing, made a mass wave of supporters strengthen. The struggle for sharia in the public space played by the movement here basically does not have a clear political agenda unless, temporarily, it is used only in electoral momentum, resonating as an expressive channel of the defeat against other groups in controlling the city's political economy space. Here, I argue that the study of ideology in social movements requires an expansion of dimensions that can explain more fully why a movement immediately grows or shrinks briefly or lasts a long time.

Keywords: *NKRI Bersyari'ah*, framing process, framing resonance, mobilization

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Introduction

ONE OF THE PLATFORMS of the Islamic Defending Action movement in several waves of 2016-2017 was the struggle for the implementation of formalized sharia in the administration of the

state, in the jargon that their central figure Habib Rizieq Shihab often shouted, namely "*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia bersyariah (NKRI Bersyari'ah)*". In responding to this, some political elites and scholars in Indonesia tend to have the same opinion about Islamic movements such as the 212 action, that the movement was mobilized by a hard-line (radical) Islamic ideology, which is intolerant, lacking commitment to the ideology of Pancasila.[1] Vedi R. Hadiz,[2] Najib Burhani,[3] Iswandi K. Putra,[4] and Greg Fealy[5] call this movement temporary Islamism, namely Islamism that negotiates with democracy, follows available political mechanisms, and may still have a main agenda such as establishing an Islamic state.

However, this tendency to homogenize views does not help us to understand more broadly, especially what ideas are like as representations of thoughts and complaints that develop in Islamic society. Are ideas inherently rigid and strictly played? And can ideas be automatically connected with events and actions? In answering this problem, David Snow argues that the use of the concept of ideology in reading movements is often burdened by two misguided tendencies: the first is to view ideology as homogeneous and monochromatic; the second is to conceptualize it as a tightly coupled and inelastic set of values, beliefs, and ideas. These two tendencies cloud our understanding of social movements in general. Therefore it is important to elaborate here on how movement carries out the process of framing and resonates it. This step is useful for understanding more deeply that each movement is not the same but is always associated with the

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[1] Ridwan, "Hendropriyono Soroti Aksi 212, 'Pengerahan Massa Hanya Dibenarkan Di Negara Komunis,'" *Pojoksatu*, December 1, 2016.

[2] Vedi R. Hadiz, "Islamic Populism in Indonesia: Emergence and Limitations," *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Indonesia*, 2018, 296–306, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315628837.

[3] Najib Burhani, "Aksi Bela Islam Konservatisme: Konservatisme Dan Fragmentasi Otoritas Keagamaan," *Jurnal Maarif* 11 (2016): 135–56.

[4] Iswandi Syahputra, "Activities on Twitter and the 212 Defend Islam Rally through the Perspective of the Indonesian Ulema Council," *Al-Jami'ah* 58, no. 2 (2020): 323–54, https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2020.582.323-354.

[5] Greg Fealy, "Reflections on a Reunion in Jakarta," *New Mandala*, December 5, 2017.

events that occurred, from here then it come the urge to take action together.[6] If the connection between ideological principles and certain world events was as direct and self-evident as is often assumed, there would be less diversity among Islamic movements, less internal debate among movement participants, and more harmony between them. Islamic movements have always experienced fragmentation, including the Islamic Defense Action movement.[7]

In summary, the fundamental problem with the conventional use of ideology as a kind of explanatory variable is that it tends to be reified and treated as a given rather than as a topic for analysis, thereby neglecting the discursive ideological work required to articulate and elaborate on the array of possible relationships between ideas, events, and action.

This movement has carried out various actions since the end of 2016 regarding the case of blasphemy against the Qur'an in Jakarta. Furthermore, in the socio-political process in North Sumatra, especially in the 2019-2021 period, there have been many follow-up actions on the streets and in the media regarding sharia ideas in public spaces. I observed the continuity of the themes of the activities they carried out in the city, linking it to the electoral political momentum such as the 2019 North Sumatra gubernatorial election. Then, I interviewed some of the organizational elites for this movement at the North Sumatra level such as chairpersons, secretaries, orators in action, and chairmen of the media and publication sector, a division that prepares movement framing materials for propaganda needs. Then, for the need to study data supporting documents, I browsed through some of their publications in the mass media, social media accounts, and the YouTube platform.

In this article, I examine the idea of the *NKRI Bersyari'ah* and its relation to events and actions related to the Islamic movement

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[6] David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd, "Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements," *Mobilization* 12, no. 2 (2007): 119–36, https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.12.2.5717148712w21410.

[7] Najib Burhani, "Plural Islam and Contestation of Religious Authority in Indonesia," *Islam in Southeast Asia*, 2019, 140–63, https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814818001-009.

in Medan, as a topic for analysis, and demonstrate the usefulness of a framing perspective in unraveling and illuminating these links by focusing on the core framing tasks and processes of articulation and frame elaboration. It is through this process that ideas, beliefs, and events are linked in ways that have helped to justify and inspire the Islamic movement and its activities.

In terms of political geography, Medan is important to be explored as an arena of movement. Medan is the closest neighbor to Aceh which has implemented Islamic law in their territory.[8] Social interaction through trade and political contacts is quite close between these two regions. Second, Medan has historically had industrial plantations, paper, and other commodities since the colonial era, which in social dynamics resulted in protest movements from workers, people's movements fighting for land ownership rights,[9] and social revolution.[10] However, recently the movement has shown no significant actions in the city. What often appears in the city in protest actions and shows of force comes more from Islamic groups.

In the context of the 2017 Islamic Defense Action movement, Medan is included as a big wave, after Jakarta and Bandung. Is the movement here fully understood as the result of the resonance of Islamic ideas? Are there other ideas like the idea of democracy, poverty, and unemployment, injustice, which allow more people to get involved in the action of the movement? How does the process of framing the Islamic movement work here, how can they develop a resonant framing strategy that has been designed, which then generates a lot of support?

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[8] The implementation of Sharia bylaw in Aceh has been started since the reform era in 1999. For the contemporary issue on it, see, for example, Azhari Yahya et al., "Legal Study of Building Sharia-Based Investment in Aceh: The Challenges After the Enactment of the Qanun of Sharia Financial Institution," *Samarah: Jurnal Hukum Keluarga Dan Hukum Islam* 7, no. 2 (May 28, 2023): 959–77, https://doi.org/10.22373/sjhk.v7i2.17653.

[9] Budi. Agustono, *Violence on North Sumatra's Plantations. Roots of Violence in Indonesia* (Brill, 2002).

[10] Anthony Reid, *The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra.* (NUS Press, 2014).

NKRI Bersyari'ah in Medan

This section elaborates on how Islamism came to the idea of the *NKRI Bersyari'ah* to inspire the movement, how movement actors resonate with the idea of the *NKRI Bersyari'ah* as material for mobilizing movement participants, and with that they contest to gain access to the political economy in Medan.

Islamism is a movement that makes Islam not just a religion, but more than that it makes the religion as a political ideology of state power. Movements like this do not only exist in Indonesia but are also a global phenomenon. Formally, the names of their movements are not the same, but the characteristics of the movements and ideas they carry are the same, namely the echo of Islam as a guide to life, the way of life. As an idea, Islamism is not static but dynamic. Shifts in interpretation and action are closely related to the existential context in which and when the bearers move. For example, the *da'wah* and *usrah* movement which transformed into *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS* (Prosperous Justice Party) is said to have been inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.[11]

In the Indonesian context, Islamism at the beginning of its development used an underground strategy. This strategy is used realistically by looking at unfavorable socio-political realities such as the pressure of the power structure on Islam. in the New Order era, Suharto preferred to promote Liberal Islam over Conservative.[12] Furthermore, in the reformation era when the valves of freedom and democratization were wide open, the transformation of the Islamist movement entered into the process of institutionalizing democracy on the one hand and in the form of violence on the other. In the process of democratization, the movement found momentum to form political parties and participate as election participants. In addition, at the regional level, Islamism echoes Islamic formalities in administering the state at the regional government level in the form of Sharia

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[11] Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy., *"Joining the Caravan." Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia* (New South Wales, Australia: Lowy Institute, 2005).

[12] Martin Van Bruinessen, ed., *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the 'Conservative Turn'* (ISEAS Publishing, 2013).

Regional Regulations.[13] The strengthening pressure of Islamism in the process of democratization is also supported by non-parliamentary forces, namely the vigilante movement, which imposes privileges for the application of Islamic values under the guise of violence. In this case, we can say *Front Pembela Islam/FPI* (Islamic Defender Front) as an example.[14] This situation occurs amidst the weakening of the state monopoly in community management. Moreover, Islamism in part takes a more extreme pattern, namely violent terrorism. In this position then, the face of Islamism received quite strong resistance in society, the state also took part in beating down this movement by setting up several tactical counter-terrorism institutions such as the *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme/BNPT* (National Counterterrorism Agency), up to disbanding the organization the case of dissolution and prohibition the existence of *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia/HTI* and FPI several years ago.

In a squeezed position, as has been described, Islamism is transformed into a friendlier face. They develop a popular strategy carrying populist themes to gain the sympathy of the people, such as on issues of corruption, public services, and pro-people policies. Changes like this are called by Vedi Hadiz Islamic populism.[15] Islamism is present to accompany what is the problem of people. Here they describe the reality of modern and secular life which has no positive impact on the lives of Muslims except misery. Therefore they offer Islam as a way out of the chaos of the system and the ugliness of public space. In this context, it can then be understood that the emergence of Islamism's bearers in mobilizing

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[13] Robin Bush, "Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?," *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, no. March 2007 (2008): 174–91. See also Irma Suryani et al., "Integration of Islamic Law in Regional Development in Indonesia," *JURIS (Jurnal Ilmiah Syariah)* 22, no. 1 (April 30, 2023): 1–11, https://doi.org/10.31958/juris.v22i1.8770.

[14] Ian Wilson, *Morality Racketeering: Vigilantism and Populist Islamic Militancy in Indonesia. In Between Dissent and Power* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Tomas Petru, "The Front Pembela Islam: Well-Connected Indonesian Radicals. A Threat or a Spent Force," *Graffiti, Converts and Vigilantes: Islam Outside the …*, no. June (2015): 57–79.

[15] Hadiz, "Islamic Populism in Indonesia: Emergence and Limitations."

Islamic masses in wavy actions spanning 2016-2017 in Jakarta, and various regions in Indonesia, including in Medan.

The concept of the *NKRI Bersyari'ah* originates from a lecture by the leader of FPI, namely Habib Riziq Shihab (HRS) on the Youtube platform with the account name Front TV as the official representative account of FPI and scattered in many accounts.[16] This account published a video with a duration of 3 minutes 44 seconds on August 2, 2018. In the video, there are 17 points of the concept of the *NKRI Bersyariah*, where the point of pressing the explanation ends in the meaning that the *NKRI Bersyariah* is a longing for a country that is run by Pancasila and the 18 August 1945 Constitution the original which was animates the Jakarta Charter of 22 June, 1945, according to the mandate of the Presidential Decree 5 July, 1959.

The concept of *NKRI Bersyari'ah* is a country that is religious, not communist or atheist without religion, which believes in the One God, which upholds the noble values of Belief in the One God, which is submissive and obedient to the laws of God Almighty, namely the law of Allah.

The concept also is a just and civilized humane state, which maintains the unity of Indonesia and prioritizes deliberation in the life of the nation and state, under the mandate of the people's principles led by wisdom in deliberating representatives. This concept rejects socialist neoliberalism and capitalist neoliberalism to realize the principle of social justice for all Indonesian people.

The *NKRI Bersyari'ah* guarantees every religious community to carry out their respective religious rituals and rituals, which protects the people from all immorality, presents officials who are trustworthy and not treacherous, protects Muslims as the majority people of Indonesia from consuming all illicit products, both food and beverages and clothing as well as cosmetics and cleaning tools and medicines.

The *NKRI Bersyari'ah* is the concept of a state that loves and respects Islamic scholars and students, not criminalizing or terrorizing them. A country that makes indigenous people masters

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[16] Muhammad Habib Riziq, "Apa Itu NKRI Bersyari'ah?," 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MgKWP0a927s.

in their own country, that respects and protects madrasas and Islamic boarding schools, not marginalizes and suspects them, that is anti-corruption, anti-alcoholic, anti-narcotics, anti-gambling, anti-pornography, anti-pornographic, anti-prostitution, anti-LGBT, anti-terrorist, anti-separatist, anti-slander, anti-lie, anti-tyranny.

The *NKRI bersyari'ah* is understood as a concept based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution which was imbued with the Jakarta Charter of 22 June, 1945 according to the mandate of the Presidential Decree 5 July, 1959.

In Medan, the poor performance of public spaces has also become a trigger for the growth of the Islamist movement. *Front Umat Islam/FUI* (Islamic People's Front), *Gerakan Anti Penistaan Agama Islam/GAPAI* (Anti-Islam Blasphemy Movement), and *Gerakan Nasional Pembela Fatwa Ulama/GNPF* (National Movement for Guarding Ulama Fatwa) North Sumatra as examples. Here, they are no longer advocating the establishment of an Islamic caliphate but on more concrete Islamic ideas such as *NKRI Bersyari'ah*, carrying Islamic leaders for regional heads and Islamic public spheres. This movement arose due to the chaos of urban spatial governance which resulted in many evictions and demolition of mosques in urban areas due to city government policies and the interests of developers. This condition was exacerbated by the absence of a protest movement from civil society in what they usually do, namely people's advocacy. Therefore, the events of the demolition of several mosques and their replacement with modern business locations in the city of Medan are described as the defeat of the Muslim community and the government's impartiality towards Islam.

The framing perspective is rooted in the symbolic interactionist and constructionist principles that meaning does not automatically or naturally attach itself to the objects, events, or experiences that we encounter, but often emerges, on the contrary, through an interactive-based interpretive process. Consistent with this principle of orientation the framing perspective, as has developed in the social movement arena since the mid-1980s. This perspective focuses on the work of meaning or the construction of meaning carried out by social movement activists and participants and other parties (eg, antagonists, elites, media, counter-

movements) that are relevant to the interests of social movements and the challenges they face.

Resonate Framing

In mid-November 2016, a video circulated containing Ahok's speech while visiting the Kepulauan Seribu, Jakarta. The video provoked a hot reaction from the Jakarta Islamic group and demanded a legal opinion from the Islamic authorities, in this case, the National MUI. Responding to this later, MUI held discussions since early October 2016 and issued the Central MUI Religious Opinions and Attitudes on October 11, 2016. Then, Islamic groups formed a movement to oversee the MUI fatwa under the name GNPF MUI.

On October 14, 2016, they carried out an action entitled "Aksi Bela Islam" demanding legal proceedings against the non-active governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok). The demonstrators suspected that Ahok had committed blasphemy after circulating a video recording of his speech in the Kepulauan Seribu. The dominant discourse developed by the GNPF-MUI is that Ahok has committed blasphemy. Ahok as the head of the Jakarta provincial government, a leader, Chinese and non-Muslims have dared to say that Al-Maidah verse 51 was used to deceive the public so they do not vote for infidel leaders.

Ahok's statement on the Kepulauan Seribu was framed as a form of blasphemy because it was spoken to the Indonesian Muslim community and had something to do with the prospect agenda for his candidacy in the regional election in 2017. Then, Ahok's statement was interpreted more broadly and was aimed at all Muslims in Indonesia, not only in the Kepulauan Seribu. This message then spread to the wider public and generated sympathy from Muslims outside Jakarta. Then in the follow-up action, many Muslims came to Jakarta to take part in the action.

Ahok's statement "don't want to be lied to by using Al-Maidah 51" raises the assumption that the clerics, teachers of the Koran, and preachers who convey the teachings of the Koran, are lying. This is where it was propagated that Ahok insulted the clergy, which was a position revered by Muslims. Ahok's statement is seen as having a tendency to obscure the understanding of

selecting Muslim leaders and indicates that the Alqur'an Surah Al-Maidah is used as a medium to deceive the audience. The meaning of Ahok's speech event aims to create social motivation so that Muslims take part in a joint action by positioning Ahok as the common enemy of Muslims throughout Indonesia. As a result, people who felt they had to defend their religion and even people who simply wanted to gain new experiences joined this movement. Here, it can be understood that the people involved in the movement are individuals driven by the same experiences who have the same identity. This collective identity was formed from mass anger against Ahok's statement, about his position as a Chinese-Christian double minority.

The formation of a collective identity as a defender of Islam has an impact in the form of continued framing; First, people outside of Islam, especially Chinese and Christians, are common enemies. This then gets theological legitimacy from the verse of the Alquran which means "and will never be willing to you from among the Jews and Christians until you follow their millah". Second, the meaning that a group of Muslims who were not involved in several episodes of the Islamic Defense Action are classified differently as non-defenders of Islam. This framing reached the form of social sanctions for Muslims who did not take part in the action and even voted for Ahok in the regional election of Jakarta.

The existence of this phenomenon then indicates the finding that social movement groups do not only form framing of an issue, to garner support to change reality, in this context, Ahok was imprisoned which made him unpopular in the Jakarta gubernatorial election. However, the framing made by movement groups can be aimed at dealing with new realities in line with the changes that occur as a result of the activities of the movement, in this case, the framing of movement groups aims to create the impression that groups supporting Ahok and Islamic groups who do not take part in defending Islam as opponents. In Medan, framing like this was developed massively in city mosques, religious teachers and preachers generally supported the solidarity of the Islamic Defense Action movement, demanding that Ahok be punished. Others have taken a different stance by not supporting

the action because it is political, and emotional and lacks dialogue. Several *ustadz* and lecturers took a stand to support the action based on solidarity or fear of disappointment from the people if they found out that the *ustadz* was acting normally or did not support the action.[17]

An open attitude against the current of the emotional people will result in being fatally abandoned by the congregation.[18] Some of his professional friends who did not support the action were removed from the list of preachers at the mosque by the Mosque Prosperity Board or dropped from the Friday sermon schedule as preachers.[19] the Mosque Prosperity Board's attitude in removing or even crossing out the names of preachers who support Ahok is considered to be inconsistent with the concept of *ukhuwah Islamiyah* (Islamic brotherhood), [20] and hearting the umma.[21] Several other *ustadz* experienced wider framing, their names were spread on Facebook as *ustadz* who committed doubtful acts,[22] and there's more, *ustadz* are branded as infidels and enemies of Islam.[23]

Movement actors interpret the slow handling of Ahok's legal case by generalizing that the state protects those who insult the Koran and Muslims as victims of injustice or "injustice frames".[24] The frame here includes embedding the word Islam in the title of the action, namely 'Action to Defend Islam', and in every discourse they develop, the frame of Islamic discourse. For example, this frame can be seen in many speeches and statements in various media and social media. "Muslims have been blamed, therefore we

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[17] Muhammad Ali, "Penceramah Pengajian, Perbincangan Dilakukan Pada 2 Juli 2021 Di Medan."

[18] Ali.

[19] Muhammad Miftah, "Penceramah Pengajian, Perbincangan Di Lakukan Pada 12 Agustus 2021 Di Medan."

[20] Junaidi, "Pengurus BKM, Perbincangan Dilakukan Pada 12 Juli 2021," n.d.

[21] Feprizal, "Pengurus BKM Di Medan, Perbincangan Dilakukan Pada 14 Agustus 2021."

[22] Muhammad Rizki, "Penceramah Pengajian, Perbincangan Dilakukan Di Medan 2 Agustus 2021."

[23] Muhammad Rudi, "Penceramah Pengajian, Perbincangan Dilakukan Pada 23 Juli 2021 Di Medan."

[24] William a Gamson et al., "Media Images and the Social," *Review Literature And Arts Of The Americas* 18, no. 1992 (1992): 373–93.

must reject foreign, capitalism, secularism, liberalism, and communism." "Blasphemy of the Alquran, blasphemy against Islam, mutilation of Ulama, arrest of Islamic scholars and activists". The propagandists of the movement accused the State of being adherents of secularism and liberalism. Joko Widodo's administration was accused of being close to China and Communism. Tumpal Panggabean[25] and Rafdinal[26] clarified that several public policies carried out by the government during the Joko Widodo era specifically harmed Muslims. In the case discussed here, namely, the GNPF Ulama of North Sumatra shows the problem that Islam is being threatened or attacked and often gets injustice from the state. Initially, in various actions, the GNPF Ulama of North Sumatra called for insulting and insulting the Alquran by Ahok in his speech at the Kepulauan Seribu, Jakarta. The protest was not a form of hatred towards Ahok as a Christian and Chinese, but this figure was only a representation of the many forms of insults committed by people outside of Islam.[27] In addition, the presence of the GNPF Ulama of North Sumatra is not to bring down Ahok personally but to oppose every form of tyranny, Islamic phobia, and blasphemy against religion.[28] However, the slow handling of this case is read as government and state support for Ahok.

In strengthening the framing of injustice experienced by Muslims and increasing sympathy and support for the movement, movement actors choose a time and place to gather that is considered to strengthen the collective and sympathetic identity of Muslims. Demonstrations organized by the GNPF Ulama of North Sumatra are usually held on Fridays. To strengthen the movement's propaganda echoes, this action plan was disseminated a few days before the action was carried out through

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[25] Tumpal Panggabean, "Wakil Ketua GNPF Ulama Sumatera Utara Dan Delegasi Khusus Dengan GNPF Ulama Di Jakarta, Wawancara 1 Juni 2021."

[26] Rafdinal, "Tokoh GNPF SU Perwakilan Muhammadiyah, Wawancara Di Medan 28 Mei 2021" (n.d.).

[27] Panggabean, "Wakil Ketua GNPF Ulama Sumatera Utara Dan Delegasi Khusus Dengan GNPF Ulama Di Jakarta, Wawancara 1 Juni 2021."

[28] Nazwir Aidan Panggabean, "Ketua GNPF Ulama Sumatera Utara, Wawancara 2 Juni 2021, Di Medan" (n.d.).

media statements, and social media distribution, and shared by the personal accounts of movement supporters. The demonstration schedule starts at dawn with congregational morning prayers at the designated mosque, then, they have breakfast together and listen to recitations until noon. For Muslims, Friday is the most glorious day (*sayyidul ayyam*) when Muslims gather for Friday prayer at noon. In this activity, the preacher delivers a sermon whose content is not far from the movement's propaganda material, then, after Friday prayer the participants in the action gather at courtyard of the mosque and then do a long march to the target government office or agency. In this crowd, it is easy for agitators to convey their discourse and garner support until mobilization.

On the way, through various lectures by propagandists, it was said that efforts were being made to divide Islam by clashing fundamentalist and traditional Islamic groups as well as attempts at treason, terrorism, and criminalization of Islamic Ulama. The clearest example of this lecture was delivered by Rizieq Shihab during a visit to Medina. This lecture was then distributed via social media. The discourse offered by the GNPF Ulama of North Sumatra: currently Islam is being threatened so it must be defended. It is also clear that Islam, the Qur'an, and the Ulama are presented as victims of injustice. In the GNPF Ulama of North Sumatra, many issues were blamed such as liberalism, capitalism, secularism, anti-asylum, and foreigners. GNPF Ulama of North Sumatra feels that Muslims are accused of treason, terror, and criminalization of figures who are perceived as Muslims. Even though, this movement is still in the corridor of decency, prohibiting anarchism, and loving the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The GNPF Ulama of North Sumatra since November 2016 has offered an alternative solution to the problem very clearly in the case of blasphemy against the Qur'an in Jakarta, namely Ahok's imprisonment.

Furthermore, in the context of motivational framing, propaganda that can motivate and encourage people to get

involved together relies on the motivator.[29] In this case, it can be seen that the GNPF Ulama North Sumatra is supported by accomplished motivators who can ignite the enthusiasm of their supporters. Rizieq Shihab, with his self-identification as Habib and clothing that shows high piety, for example, has based the listeners' binary position on whether they want to be in the position of being a defender of religion or a position of silence that does not take sides. In his oration, you can also see him loudly calling for "revolution", and shouting "*Allahu Akbar*", "*NKRI Bersyari'ah*". These words have a very strong motivation to trigger emotional and heroic Islamic sentiments.

Apart from that, there is also the motivation to defend the Ulama, to guard the Ulama. These words strengthen the framing of the first defense, namely defending Islam. The words defending the clergy and guarding the clergy are aimed at giving awareness to Muslims to take a firm stance against the actions that terrorized the clergy, the stabbing of several *ustadz*, and the arrest of Habib Rizieq, and several GNPF central figures in several places including four GNPF figures who were arrested by the North Sumatra Regional Police at the end of 2019.[30] The more it is seen that these figures were arrested by the security forces, the stronger the heroic cries of the supporters of defending religion will become.

Tweets, Mosques, and Streets

Effective framing is framing that resonates. This work is indicated by how clear the offer is for interested parties, how consistent it is, how factual credibility is, and the credibility of the framing initiator. This work process cannot ignore the media as a means or tool for conveying and spreading messages. The mass media has indirectly contributed to building and developing the meaning of an event. In addition, the media participates in resonating propagative messages so that people's perceptions of

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[29] Robert D. Benford and A. Snow, David, "Framing Processes and Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26, no. 1 (2000): 611–39.

[30] Rafdinal, "Tokoh GNPF SU Perwakilan Muhammadiyah, Wawancara Di Medan 28 Mei 2021."

the facts of events are formed according to the intent of the framing makers.

The GNPF Ulama of North Sumatra took two media spaces to echo their framing, which has become spaces for other groups to fight for, namely physical spaces such as mosques and streets, and virtual spaces on social media, WA, and other digital platforms such as Youtube. In the second space, it can be considered quite effective for the movement, especially when the development of the internet and social media has reached various corners,[31] and what's more when voices are relatively limited in actual space, making social movements via the internet more flexible,[32] such as in Iran and Egypt.[33] Muzayyin Ahyar emphasized that the model of activism in the internet space has dynamized and contributed to the development of democracy in post-Suharto Indonesia,[34] even in the case of Action to Defend Islam, social media is a new algorithmic space that creates "clicktivism" activism in cyberspace more freely and accelerated, which in turn can form Islamic authorities that are quite strong and influential.[35]

Framing resonance with a strong echo will get more mass mobilization support. In carrying out each of its actions, the GNPF Ulama of North Sumatra mobilized the movement in various ways, starting from tweets on Twitter, FB, and WA, recitations at mosques, to taking to the streets and holding long marches and

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[31] Katja Cronauer, "Activism and the Internet: A Socio-Political Analysis of How the Use of Electronic Mailing Lists Affects Mobilization in Social Movement Organizations" (The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 2004).

[32] Melissa Y Lerner, "Connecting the Actual with the Virtual: The Internet and Social Movement Theory in the Muslim World—The Cases of Iran and Egypt," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 30, no. 4 (2010): 555–74.

[33] Nahed Eltantawy and Julie B. Wiest, "Social Media in the Egyptian Revolution: Reconsidering Resource Mobilization Theory," *International Journal of Communication* 5 (2011): 1207–24, https://doi.org/1932-8036/2011FEA1207.

[34] Muzayyin Ahyar, "Islamic Clicktivism: Internet, Democracy and Contemporary Islamist Activism in Surakarta," *Studia Islamika* 24, no. 3 (2017): 435–68.

[35] Muzayyin Ahyar, "Aksi Bela Islam: Islamic Clicktivism and the New Authority of Religious Propaganda in the Millennial Age in Indonesia," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 9, no. 1 (2019): 1–29.

demonstrations.[36] This pattern can be understood as a framing resonance workflow for mobilization. Hendra Febrizal as the media coordinator of the North Sumatra Ulama GNPF conducted a kind of social media training where in turn the participants who were trained would become members of the media team or pro-movement volunteers. They conduct training from mosque to mosque voluntarily. After the training is completed and media user skills are formed, participants are recruited as volunteers. These volunteers then create a special group on the WA platform. Usually, every issue is discussed in a special WA group or issues that are hot on various media platforms. In addition, the North Sumatra Ulama GNPF has a FB account in the form of a fan page and other forms of microblogs. The use of all digital media platforms is directed at countering news that is considered discriminatory against movements and Muslims in general.[37]

Discourses are amplified in this media with the awareness that urban society likes to consume this new media. Apart from the official fan page, personal accounts from movement actors or even from sympathizers also resonating the discourse by spreading this content to their various accounts.[38] Support or debate occurs in the comments column, not infrequently for an issue that criticizes the government and contains elements of racism also launched there. After that, this issue was brought up in lectures at the recitation forum they held. These recitations are held in several mosque locations around the city of Medan such as the Al Jihad Mosque on Abdullah Lubis Road, the Al Munawar mosque in Teladan, the Amal Silaturrahim Mosque in the Medan Area, and several other mosques. Apart from the recitation organized by the GNPF Ulama of North Sumatra, this movement also calls on preachers, *ustadz*, and ulama, who have recitation groups in various places in the city to discuss the issues they have determined.[39]

At the North Sumatra Ulama GNPF, Hendra is indeed in control of the media and publications. He is an employee of one of

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[36] Hendra Febrizal, "Ketua Bidang Publikasi Dan Media, Wawancara via Telepon Seluler 1 Juli 2021."

[37] Febrizal.

[38] Febrizal.

[39] Febrizal.

the private companies and has major expertise in photography.[40] Then, Hendra joined this movement voluntarily in 2016. He admitted that he felt called upon to help public works, in this case, by assisting in developing photography, and videography skills, and the process of disseminating the results on digital platforms.[41] Hendra saw an imbalance of competence in carrying out da'wah strategies on social media channels, this imbalance which then led to an imbalance of discourse in cyberspace. At this point, Hendra feels that the Muslim community has been constructed by the media in such a way, experiencing injustice and discrimination in reporting.[42]

From several social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, WA, Telegram, Twitter, and the Youtube platform, the most influential in the spreading process is Facebook.[43] This is because Facebook users are more numerous and attractive than other media. Hendra stressed that the discourse war on social media is real. His experience managing the movement's official account cannot be considered seamless. Even though there are tens of thousands of supporters and followers on the official account, counter-narrative groups often hijack their accounts. Hendra's admission that since the end of 2019, none of the seven accounts named GNPF Ulama North Sumatra can be accessed anymore.[44] All were subject to take down, or muzzled. Apart from the official account, Hendra's account has been taken down at least six times, so he was forced to create a new, seventh account.[45] This experience, said Hendra, is a risk from propaganda movements that are more anti-regime in tone. The influence of this movement's resonance seems to be dimmer, apart from experiencing the takedown of a number of their official accounts, also in line with the arrests of some movement activists carried out by the North Sumatra Regional Police in the 2019 medium.[46]

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[40] Febrizal.

[41] Febrizal.

[42] Febrizal.

[43] Febrizal.

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[45] Febrizal.

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Social Political Psychology

The resonance of framing for collective action is influenced by its salience for the target group for mobilization.[47] The dimension of clarity is seen from the aspects of centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity. Centrality concerns how important the beliefs, values, or ideas associated with the framing of the movement are for the life of the target group for mobilization. Proximity to experience deals with the question of whether the framing is aligned with or related to the daily personal experiences of the mobilization target group, or whether they are too abstract and distant from the life and experiences of the target group. The closer a frame is to the personal experience of the target masses, the clearer they are and the greater the potential for successful mobilization. The final factor that has a major influence on frame echo is narrative alignment, namely how deeply the frames offered are rooted in the narratives of the targeted mass culture, and how well they fit with the "myths", dominant beliefs, and ideologies embraced by the targeted masses. If such a link exists, then the frame has a narrative alignment. The greater the harmony of a narrative frame offered, the clearer it will be for the targeted masses and the greater their potential to mobilize the masses.

In the *Aksi Bela Islam* (Islam Defense Action) frenzy of 2016, some of the issues raised by its supporters cover a wide range of issues. Apart from the issue of blasphemy, other issues with a wider scope emerged and became the subject of public discussion. Some of the things that were debated included the issue of social justice, economic domination by certain groups such as the Nine Dragons, the arrival of thousands of workers from China, the rise of communism and or more precisely the Indonesian Communist Party, Western domination of the Islamic world, attempts by other parties to destroy Islam in Indonesia, etc.

Framing like this is very close to the life experience of Muslims in Medan. GNPF Ulama of North Sumatra made these issues as raw materials to build a frame of Islamic oppression as a result of the domination of the Chinese Political Economy in Medan,

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[47] Benford and Snow, David, "Framing Processes and Social Movements."

Christian groups in political parties, and government structures.[48] The traces of the politics of hatred have been explained in chapter three of this dissertation. The problems of "Native Sons", "Native and Non-native Groups", loyal religious rules, and tribalism have never been absent in Medan's urban dynamics.[49]

The movement framing built by movement actors in Jakarta echoed easily in Medan and gained supporters. In addition, this framing can even move last longer and the length is adjusted to the right momentum. The reason is, in Medan, the controversy surrounding the emergence of non-Muslim regional heads has lasted longer than Jakarta in 2017. For example, 2008 when the election for the governor of North Sumatra took place when Rudolf Pardede, a Christian served as Governor to replace Tengku Rizal Nurdin in the latter half of his leadership period and ran for governor of North Sumatra 2008-2013. This event was responded to emotionally by urban Islamic groups by forming the "Ummah Coalition". Similar identity politics is even hotter, the situation can refer to the experience of the Medan mayoral election in 2010. One of the strong figures who competed in the Pilkada event was Sofyan Tan, a Chinese and Christian, supported by PDIP paired with Nelly Armayanti, a Minang Muslim woman representing the Indonesian people. The experience of playing identity politics and mobilizing the ummah with narratives of defending Islam, defending the dignity of Islam, and choosing Islamic leaders, has been experienced by urban Muslims in Medan. The hard fight of religious and ethnic identity in defeating Sofyan Tan has mobilized almost all the forces of Islamic movements and organizations here.[50]

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[48] Rafdinal, "Tokoh GNPF SU Perwakilan Muhammadiyah, Wawancara Di Medan 28 Mei 2021."

[49] Faisal Riza, "The Involvement of Ulama in the Medan Mayoral Election of 2010 Faisal Riza," in *Workshop on Muslim Religious Authority in Contemporary Asia* (Singapore: Asia Research Institute, NUS, 2011).

[50] Edward Aspinall, Sebastian Dettman, and Eve Warburton, "When Religion Trumps Ethnicity: A Regional Election Case Study from Indonesia," *South East Asia Research* 19, no. 1 (2011): 27–58, https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2011.0034.

Then, in 2018 there were regional head elections at the provincial and district levels which were simultaneously held here. Coincidentally, the figure who took part in this event was a figure identified as someone close to the figure of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), namely Djarot Saiful Hidayat, former deputy governor of DKI Jakarta during Ahok's leadership and who returned as a partner in the 2017 event. Muslim resistance is getting worse because they think that Djarot is a figure who has the same problems as when he led Jakarta. Then, according to Rafdinal, this situation has provided new opportunities for Islamic movements such as the GNPF Ulama to carry out long-term work like in the Ahok case in Jakarta. They built a narrative on three things at once that hindered Djarot's work in North Sumatra. First, the issue of blasphemy against the Alquran which was committed by Ahok in Jakarta 2016, in which Djarot was considered involved in it because he was a candidate for deputy governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan/PDIP* as Djarot's party also supports and backs up Ahok. Second, Djarot is a non-local son, Djarot himself comes from Blitar, East Java, had served as mayor there for two terms, then was assigned by his party to assist Ahok in Jakarta in 2015. Third, Djarot in his membership as Governor was accompanied by Sihar Sitorus, a descendant of Toba Batak and Christian who apply as a candidate for Deputy.

Finally, it can be understood that urban political Islamic movements such as the GNPF Ulama of North Sumatra always get framing that is quite effective and quickly resonates in the public sphere and gains their support. This framing is easily constructed because of the historical consistency of the narrative on urban dynamics in Medan, which is always interpreted as the exclusion of Muslims from the city's strategic spaces. This framing easily resonates strongly because the historical experience shapes the inner atmosphere of Muslims in the city which influences their ways of negotiating views and living in the city. The framing that is carried out is not single and static, but the work produces new forms of framing under the meanings made by movement actors for the new reality that arises as a result of framing.

Conclusion

The description above has clarified that the ideas of the movement, in this case, Islamism, which is more populist and concrete, can enter more easily into the minds of the Islamic public. That is, these conditions are close to the social psychology of the masses, moreover meeting the right event generates great support for the movement. Second, the ability of the elites to concoct movement ideas, and manage echo media to spread framing, made the mass wave of supporters stronger. Third, Islamism does not have a clear political agenda unless, temporarily, it is used only for electoral momentum, resonating as an expressive channel of defeat against other groups in organizing the city's political economy space.

This article, of course, has limitations in the aspects of discussion that are needed, especially how ideology can be determined at a certain moment as framing material and movement energy for movements. Here, I argue that the study of ideology in social movements requires an expansion of dimensions that can explain more fully why a movement immediately grows or shrinks, briefly or lasts a long time.

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